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The European Central Bank’s quantitative easing programme is scheduled to start this month. John
Doukas writes that while the programme might well boost EU economies, there remain signiﬁcant
question marks over whether it is suﬃcient to generate substantial growth in struggling Eurozone
countries. He also notes that a scarcity of government bonds could pose problems, and that the
ECB should be prepared to pay higher prices for the purchase of government securities.
On 22 January, the European Central Bank announced that it would implement a new quantitative
easing (QE) programme. The policy is aimed at avoiding the ‘tail’ risk arising from the lack of
growth, especially in the EU periphery (ﬁscally distressed southern states) as a result of the austerity policies
imposed in the name of restructuring since the global ﬁnancial crisis erupted in 2008.
While the programme might help to boost the EU economy by reducing interest rates and forcing the euro to trade at
lower valuations against other currencies (particularly the US dollar), as well as ﬁghting deﬂationary forces
underway in the Eurozone, there are signiﬁcant doubts whether such an expansionary monetary policy, as it has
been announced, will be eﬀective enough to revive the Eurozone economy. The reasons?
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First, similar attempts in the past have failed to move the
EU economy out of recession. Second, this is too late: a
bold QE policy should have taken place at least 2-3 years
ago. Third, monetary policy, as a substitute for ﬁscal
policy, is subject to well-known balance sheet limitations,
primarily when it is driven by the need to avoid deﬂation,
as seems to be the ECB’s position now. Another reason
is that the ECB does not yet have the full legal and, in
particular, the German ‘green light’ to conduct a massive
purchase of government debt (bonds) from the EU states.
Fourth, besides the quantitative limits of the announced
QE programme, it is also designed to be ‘selective’ and
not directed towards the EU states that have been
economically more stagnant. Instead, as it has been announced so far, it actually favours the purchase of
government bonds from EU states with stronger Eurozone economies. That is, the ones that have suﬀered less
from the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. This, in turn, is expected to raise the gap of interest rates between the northern and
southern EU states even further. Speciﬁcally, lowering interest rates in the north, but having very little impact, if any,
on the cost of borrowing for the suﬀering southern periphery.
Fifth, unlike the US version of QE, the ECB will not engage in non-government asset purchases, which are
necessary to lessen the liquidity constraints of the private sector. Hence, even if it succeeds in lowering short-term
interest rates, lowering interest rates alone is not enough to stimulate the real economy as long as the private sector
remains reluctant to borrow and invest. That is, a lower cost of borrowing alone is not suﬃcient to revise upwards
business expectations, and, in turn, encourage business to invest and reduce the high rate of EU unemployment.
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Sixth, given the current state of economic aﬀairs, lower EU interest rates will encourage capital outﬂows outside of
the Eurozone in an attempt to ﬁnd higher yielding investment opportunities elsewhere. However, lowering interest
rates in the southern EU periphery, which is not planned by the new QE, since there is a preference by the ECB to
purchase government securities from the more creditworthy Eurozone countries, could encourage the undertaking
of new investments and help these countries to achieve higher rates of growth, employment and, ﬁnally, lessen the
burden of their external debt. If the ECB is to keep the Eurozone together in accordance with Mario Draghi’s pledge
to do ‘whatever it takes’, it should set a 3-4 per cent nominal GDP target rather than a 2 per cent deﬂation target.
Finally, the European Central Bank’s plan to bring the Eurozone out of its economic discomfort by purchasing 1.1
trillion euros of bonds may be constrained, even before it starts this month. The reason is that there is going to be a
shortage of new supply (scarcity of government bonds) and a lack of willing government bond sellers. Net issuance
of government securities is expected to be negative for the ﬁrst time while the safest Eurozone securities held by
banks, insurers and pension funds are unlikely to be traded (i.e. available for the ECB to purchase). This will impede
ECB eﬀorts to buy in about 19 months the same fraction of government bonds as the Fed did in about six years of
Treasury purchases.
This, in turn, will thwart the ECB’s attempts to ﬁght deﬂation/boost inﬂation. Of the ECB’s 60 billion-euro monthly
purchase plan, about 45 billion euros represents sovereign debt, which implies an intention to purchase 14 per cent
of Eurozone government bonds outstanding by September 2016, or 18 per cent of securities from countries such as
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – the only nations with two or more AAA ratings from the three
major credit-assessment companies. With about 1.3 trillion euros of the region’s sovereign bonds yielding less than
zero per cent, bondholders of these securities will be more reluctant to sell, diminishing the overall eﬀectiveness of
the ECB’s QE policy.
We should note here that it took the Fed about six years, and three rounds of QE, to raise its holdings to about 20
per cent of US Treasuries. With the Bank of England holding about 31 per cent of Britain’s gilts and the Bank of
Japan still adding to the holdings of that nation’s debt, these purchases are reducing the amount of securities
worldwide that are available for trading. Reduced government spending is also expected to contribute to a global
scarcity of sovereign debt. Germany is expected to limit the amount of conventional bonds outstanding by 8 billion
euros this year. In Spain, where the People’s Party government has carried out the deepest austerity measures in
the nation’s recent history, the net issuance target for 2015 is about 55 billion euros, down from net sales of 97
billion euros in 2012.
In sum, the ECBs’ late QE plan is expected to face a great deal of diﬃculty to ﬁnd bond sellers, leaving its target in
danger. The ECB should be prepared, then, to pay higher prices for the purchase of government securities in order
to meet its goal of pumping money into the ﬁnancial system of the Eurozone.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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